security-bugs.rst 5.0 KB

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  1. .. _securitybugs:
  2. Security bugs
  3. =============
  4. Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd
  5. like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
  6. disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the
  7. Linux kernel security team.
  8. Contact
  9. -------
  10. The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
  11. <security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers
  12. who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
  13. If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
  14. that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the
  15. security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
  16. understand and fix the security vulnerability.
  17. As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
  18. will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in
  19. 'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what
  20. information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
  21. be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
  22. made public.
  23. Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible.
  24. It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex
  25. issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments. Think of it like a
  26. :doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>`
  27. (even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list
  28. reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text.
  29. Disclosure and embargoed information
  30. ------------------------------------
  31. The security list is not a disclosure channel. For that, see Coordination
  32. below.
  33. Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts. Fixes
  34. for publicly known bugs are released immediately.
  35. Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
  36. as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
  37. the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
  38. of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
  39. if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time. The
  40. only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
  41. the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
  42. coordination.
  43. While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
  44. order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
  45. the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
  46. reporter. This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
  47. and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
  48. identity of the reporter.
  49. In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed. All other
  50. information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
  51. of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
  52. lifted, in perpetuity.
  53. Coordination with other groups
  54. ------------------------------
  55. While the kernel security team solely focuses on getting bugs fixed,
  56. other groups focus on fixing issues in distros and coordinating
  57. disclosure between operating system vendors. Coordination is usually
  58. handled by the "linux-distros" mailing list and disclosure by the
  59. public "oss-security" mailing list, both of which are closely related
  60. and presented in the linux-distros wiki:
  61. <https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros>
  62. Please note that the respective policies and rules are different since
  63. the 3 lists pursue different goals. Coordinating between the kernel
  64. security team and other teams is difficult since for the kernel security
  65. team occasional embargoes (as subject to a maximum allowed number of
  66. days) start from the availability of a fix, while for "linux-distros"
  67. they start from the initial post to the list regardless of the
  68. availability of a fix.
  69. As such, the kernel security team strongly recommends that as a reporter
  70. of a potential security issue you DO NOT contact the "linux-distros"
  71. mailing list UNTIL a fix is accepted by the affected code's maintainers
  72. and you have read the distros wiki page above and you fully understand
  73. the requirements that contacting "linux-distros" will impose on you and
  74. the kernel community. This also means that in general it doesn't make
  75. sense to Cc: both lists at once, except maybe for coordination if and
  76. while an accepted fix has not yet been merged. In other words, until a
  77. fix is accepted do not Cc: "linux-distros", and after it's merged do not
  78. Cc: the kernel security team.
  79. CVE assignment
  80. --------------
  81. The security team does not assign CVEs, nor do we require them for
  82. reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and may
  83. delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
  84. assigned for a confirmed issue, they can contact the :doc:`kernel CVE
  85. assignment team<../process/cve>` to obtain one.
  86. Non-disclosure agreements
  87. -------------------------
  88. The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
  89. to enter any non-disclosure agreements.