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- .. _securitybugs:
- Security bugs
- =============
- Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd
- like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
- disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the
- Linux kernel security team.
- Contact
- -------
- The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
- <security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers
- who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
- If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
- that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the
- security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
- understand and fix the security vulnerability.
- As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
- will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in
- 'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what
- information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
- be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
- made public.
- Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible.
- It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex
- issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments. Think of it like a
- :doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>`
- (even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list
- reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text.
- Disclosure and embargoed information
- ------------------------------------
- The security list is not a disclosure channel. For that, see Coordination
- below.
- Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts. Fixes
- for publicly known bugs are released immediately.
- Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
- as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
- the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
- of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
- if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time. The
- only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
- the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
- coordination.
- While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
- order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
- the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
- reporter. This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
- and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
- identity of the reporter.
- In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed. All other
- information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
- of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
- lifted, in perpetuity.
- Coordination with other groups
- ------------------------------
- While the kernel security team solely focuses on getting bugs fixed,
- other groups focus on fixing issues in distros and coordinating
- disclosure between operating system vendors. Coordination is usually
- handled by the "linux-distros" mailing list and disclosure by the
- public "oss-security" mailing list, both of which are closely related
- and presented in the linux-distros wiki:
- <https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros>
- Please note that the respective policies and rules are different since
- the 3 lists pursue different goals. Coordinating between the kernel
- security team and other teams is difficult since for the kernel security
- team occasional embargoes (as subject to a maximum allowed number of
- days) start from the availability of a fix, while for "linux-distros"
- they start from the initial post to the list regardless of the
- availability of a fix.
- As such, the kernel security team strongly recommends that as a reporter
- of a potential security issue you DO NOT contact the "linux-distros"
- mailing list UNTIL a fix is accepted by the affected code's maintainers
- and you have read the distros wiki page above and you fully understand
- the requirements that contacting "linux-distros" will impose on you and
- the kernel community. This also means that in general it doesn't make
- sense to Cc: both lists at once, except maybe for coordination if and
- while an accepted fix has not yet been merged. In other words, until a
- fix is accepted do not Cc: "linux-distros", and after it's merged do not
- Cc: the kernel security team.
- CVE assignment
- --------------
- The security team does not assign CVEs, nor do we require them for
- reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and may
- delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
- assigned for a confirmed issue, they can contact the :doc:`kernel CVE
- assignment team<../process/cve>` to obtain one.
- Non-disclosure agreements
- -------------------------
- The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
- to enter any non-disclosure agreements.
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