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- // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
- /*
- * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
- *
- * Copyright © 2022-2023 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
- * Copyright © 2022-2023 Microsoft Corporation
- */
- #include <linux/in.h>
- #include <linux/net.h>
- #include <linux/socket.h>
- #include <net/ipv6.h>
- #include "common.h"
- #include "cred.h"
- #include "limits.h"
- #include "net.h"
- #include "ruleset.h"
- int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
- const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights)
- {
- int err;
- const struct landlock_id id = {
- .key.data = (__force uintptr_t)htons(port),
- .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
- };
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
- /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
- access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET &
- ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
- mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
- err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
- mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
- return err;
- }
- static const struct access_masks any_net = {
- .net = ~0,
- };
- static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
- struct sockaddr *const address,
- const int addrlen,
- access_mask_t access_request)
- {
- __be16 port;
- layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
- const struct landlock_rule *rule;
- struct landlock_id id = {
- .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
- };
- const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
- landlock_get_applicable_domain(landlock_get_current_domain(),
- any_net);
- if (!dom)
- return 0;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1))
- return -EACCES;
- if (!sk_is_tcp(sock->sk))
- return 0;
- /* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */
- if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family))
- return -EINVAL;
- switch (address->sa_family) {
- case AF_UNSPEC:
- case AF_INET:
- if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
- return -EINVAL;
- port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
- break;
- #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- case AF_INET6:
- if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
- return -EINVAL;
- port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
- break;
- #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
- default:
- return 0;
- }
- /* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */
- if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
- /*
- * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
- * association, which have the same effect as closing the
- * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
- * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
- * connections is always allowed.
- *
- * For a TCP access control system, this request is legitimate.
- * Let the network stack handle potential inconsistencies and
- * return -EINVAL if needed.
- */
- if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
- return 0;
- /*
- * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
- * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
- * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
- * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
- * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
- *
- * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle these
- * checks, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
- * consistency thanks to kselftest.
- */
- if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
- /* addrlen has already been checked for AF_UNSPEC. */
- const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
- (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
- if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_INET)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
- return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * Checks sa_family consistency to not wrongfully return
- * -EACCES instead of -EINVAL. Valid sa_family changes are
- * only (from AF_INET or AF_INET6) to AF_UNSPEC.
- *
- * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle this
- * check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
- * consistency thanks to kselftest.
- */
- if (address->sa_family != sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family)
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
- rule = landlock_find_rule(dom, id);
- access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(
- dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
- if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, access_request, &layer_masks,
- ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
- return 0;
- return -EACCES;
- }
- static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock,
- struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen)
- {
- return current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
- }
- static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock,
- struct sockaddr *const address,
- const int addrlen)
- {
- return current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
- }
- static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
- };
- __init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
- {
- security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- &landlock_lsmid);
- }
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