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- // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
- /*
- * Data verification functions, i.e. hooks for ->readahead()
- *
- * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
- */
- #include "fsverity_private.h"
- #include <crypto/hash.h>
- #include <linux/bio.h>
- static struct workqueue_struct *fsverity_read_workqueue;
- /*
- * Returns true if the hash block with index @hblock_idx in the tree, located in
- * @hpage, has already been verified.
- */
- static bool is_hash_block_verified(struct fsverity_info *vi, struct page *hpage,
- unsigned long hblock_idx)
- {
- unsigned int blocks_per_page;
- unsigned int i;
- /*
- * When the Merkle tree block size and page size are the same, then the
- * ->hash_block_verified bitmap isn't allocated, and we use PG_checked
- * to directly indicate whether the page's block has been verified.
- *
- * Using PG_checked also guarantees that we re-verify hash pages that
- * get evicted and re-instantiated from the backing storage, as new
- * pages always start out with PG_checked cleared.
- */
- if (!vi->hash_block_verified)
- return PageChecked(hpage);
- /*
- * When the Merkle tree block size and page size differ, we use a bitmap
- * to indicate whether each hash block has been verified.
- *
- * However, we still need to ensure that hash pages that get evicted and
- * re-instantiated from the backing storage are re-verified. To do
- * this, we use PG_checked again, but now it doesn't really mean
- * "checked". Instead, now it just serves as an indicator for whether
- * the hash page is newly instantiated or not. If the page is new, as
- * indicated by PG_checked=0, we clear the bitmap bits for the page's
- * blocks since they are untrustworthy, then set PG_checked=1.
- * Otherwise we return the bitmap bit for the requested block.
- *
- * Multiple threads may execute this code concurrently on the same page.
- * This is safe because we use memory barriers to ensure that if a
- * thread sees PG_checked=1, then it also sees the associated bitmap
- * clearing to have occurred. Also, all writes and their corresponding
- * reads are atomic, and all writes are safe to repeat in the event that
- * multiple threads get into the PG_checked=0 section. (Clearing a
- * bitmap bit again at worst causes a hash block to be verified
- * redundantly. That event should be very rare, so it's not worth using
- * a lock to avoid. Setting PG_checked again has no effect.)
- */
- if (PageChecked(hpage)) {
- /*
- * A read memory barrier is needed here to give ACQUIRE
- * semantics to the above PageChecked() test.
- */
- smp_rmb();
- return test_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified);
- }
- blocks_per_page = vi->tree_params.blocks_per_page;
- hblock_idx = round_down(hblock_idx, blocks_per_page);
- for (i = 0; i < blocks_per_page; i++)
- clear_bit(hblock_idx + i, vi->hash_block_verified);
- /*
- * A write memory barrier is needed here to give RELEASE semantics to
- * the below SetPageChecked() operation.
- */
- smp_wmb();
- SetPageChecked(hpage);
- return false;
- }
- /*
- * Verify a single data block against the file's Merkle tree.
- *
- * In principle, we need to verify the entire path to the root node. However,
- * for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash blocks. Therefore we need
- * only ascend the tree until an already-verified hash block is seen, and then
- * verify the path to that block.
- *
- * Return: %true if the data block is valid, else %false.
- */
- static bool
- verify_data_block(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi,
- const void *data, u64 data_pos, unsigned long max_ra_pages)
- {
- const struct merkle_tree_params *params = &vi->tree_params;
- const unsigned int hsize = params->digest_size;
- int level;
- u8 _want_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
- const u8 *want_hash;
- u8 real_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
- /* The hash blocks that are traversed, indexed by level */
- struct {
- /* Page containing the hash block */
- struct page *page;
- /* Mapped address of the hash block (will be within @page) */
- const void *addr;
- /* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */
- unsigned long index;
- /* Byte offset of the wanted hash relative to @addr */
- unsigned int hoffset;
- } hblocks[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
- /*
- * The index of the previous level's block within that level; also the
- * index of that block's hash within the current level.
- */
- u64 hidx = data_pos >> params->log_blocksize;
- /* Up to 1 + FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS pages may be mapped at once */
- BUILD_BUG_ON(1 + FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS > KM_MAX_IDX);
- if (unlikely(data_pos >= inode->i_size)) {
- /*
- * This can happen in the data page spanning EOF when the Merkle
- * tree block size is less than the page size. The Merkle tree
- * doesn't cover data blocks fully past EOF. But the entire
- * page spanning EOF can be visible to userspace via a mmap, and
- * any part past EOF should be all zeroes. Therefore, we need
- * to verify that any data blocks fully past EOF are all zeroes.
- */
- if (memchr_inv(data, 0, params->block_size)) {
- fsverity_err(inode,
- "FILE CORRUPTED! Data past EOF is not zeroed");
- return false;
- }
- return true;
- }
- /*
- * Starting at the leaf level, ascend the tree saving hash blocks along
- * the way until we find a hash block that has already been verified, or
- * until we reach the root.
- */
- for (level = 0; level < params->num_levels; level++) {
- unsigned long next_hidx;
- unsigned long hblock_idx;
- pgoff_t hpage_idx;
- unsigned int hblock_offset_in_page;
- unsigned int hoffset;
- struct page *hpage;
- const void *haddr;
- /*
- * The index of the block in the current level; also the index
- * of that block's hash within the next level.
- */
- next_hidx = hidx >> params->log_arity;
- /* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */
- hblock_idx = params->level_start[level] + next_hidx;
- /* Index of the hash page in the tree overall */
- hpage_idx = hblock_idx >> params->log_blocks_per_page;
- /* Byte offset of the hash block within the page */
- hblock_offset_in_page =
- (hblock_idx << params->log_blocksize) & ~PAGE_MASK;
- /* Byte offset of the hash within the block */
- hoffset = (hidx << params->log_digestsize) &
- (params->block_size - 1);
- hpage = inode->i_sb->s_vop->read_merkle_tree_page(inode,
- hpage_idx, level == 0 ? min(max_ra_pages,
- params->tree_pages - hpage_idx) : 0);
- if (IS_ERR(hpage)) {
- fsverity_err(inode,
- "Error %ld reading Merkle tree page %lu",
- PTR_ERR(hpage), hpage_idx);
- goto error;
- }
- haddr = kmap_local_page(hpage) + hblock_offset_in_page;
- if (is_hash_block_verified(vi, hpage, hblock_idx)) {
- memcpy(_want_hash, haddr + hoffset, hsize);
- want_hash = _want_hash;
- kunmap_local(haddr);
- put_page(hpage);
- goto descend;
- }
- hblocks[level].page = hpage;
- hblocks[level].addr = haddr;
- hblocks[level].index = hblock_idx;
- hblocks[level].hoffset = hoffset;
- hidx = next_hidx;
- }
- want_hash = vi->root_hash;
- descend:
- /* Descend the tree verifying hash blocks. */
- for (; level > 0; level--) {
- struct page *hpage = hblocks[level - 1].page;
- const void *haddr = hblocks[level - 1].addr;
- unsigned long hblock_idx = hblocks[level - 1].index;
- unsigned int hoffset = hblocks[level - 1].hoffset;
- if (fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, haddr, real_hash) != 0)
- goto error;
- if (memcmp(want_hash, real_hash, hsize) != 0)
- goto corrupted;
- /*
- * Mark the hash block as verified. This must be atomic and
- * idempotent, as the same hash block might be verified by
- * multiple threads concurrently.
- */
- if (vi->hash_block_verified)
- set_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified);
- else
- SetPageChecked(hpage);
- memcpy(_want_hash, haddr + hoffset, hsize);
- want_hash = _want_hash;
- kunmap_local(haddr);
- put_page(hpage);
- }
- /* Finally, verify the data block. */
- if (fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, data, real_hash) != 0)
- goto error;
- if (memcmp(want_hash, real_hash, hsize) != 0)
- goto corrupted;
- return true;
- corrupted:
- fsverity_err(inode,
- "FILE CORRUPTED! pos=%llu, level=%d, want_hash=%s:%*phN, real_hash=%s:%*phN",
- data_pos, level - 1,
- params->hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash,
- params->hash_alg->name, hsize, real_hash);
- error:
- for (; level > 0; level--) {
- kunmap_local(hblocks[level - 1].addr);
- put_page(hblocks[level - 1].page);
- }
- return false;
- }
- static bool
- verify_data_blocks(struct folio *data_folio, size_t len, size_t offset,
- unsigned long max_ra_pages)
- {
- struct inode *inode = data_folio->mapping->host;
- struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info;
- const unsigned int block_size = vi->tree_params.block_size;
- u64 pos = (u64)data_folio->index << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0 || !IS_ALIGNED(len | offset, block_size)))
- return false;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!folio_test_locked(data_folio) ||
- folio_test_uptodate(data_folio)))
- return false;
- do {
- void *data;
- bool valid;
- data = kmap_local_folio(data_folio, offset);
- valid = verify_data_block(inode, vi, data, pos + offset,
- max_ra_pages);
- kunmap_local(data);
- if (!valid)
- return false;
- offset += block_size;
- len -= block_size;
- } while (len);
- return true;
- }
- /**
- * fsverity_verify_blocks() - verify data in a folio
- * @folio: the folio containing the data to verify
- * @len: the length of the data to verify in the folio
- * @offset: the offset of the data to verify in the folio
- *
- * Verify data that has just been read from a verity file. The data must be
- * located in a pagecache folio that is still locked and not yet uptodate. The
- * length and offset of the data must be Merkle tree block size aligned.
- *
- * Return: %true if the data is valid, else %false.
- */
- bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len, size_t offset)
- {
- return verify_data_blocks(folio, len, offset, 0);
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_blocks);
- #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
- /**
- * fsverity_verify_bio() - verify a 'read' bio that has just completed
- * @bio: the bio to verify
- *
- * Verify the bio's data against the file's Merkle tree. All bio data segments
- * must be aligned to the file's Merkle tree block size. If any data fails
- * verification, then bio->bi_status is set to an error status.
- *
- * This is a helper function for use by the ->readahead() method of filesystems
- * that issue bios to read data directly into the page cache. Filesystems that
- * populate the page cache without issuing bios (e.g. non block-based
- * filesystems) must instead call fsverity_verify_page() directly on each page.
- * All filesystems must also call fsverity_verify_page() on holes.
- */
- void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio)
- {
- struct folio_iter fi;
- unsigned long max_ra_pages = 0;
- if (bio->bi_opf & REQ_RAHEAD) {
- /*
- * If this bio is for data readahead, then we also do readahead
- * of the first (largest) level of the Merkle tree. Namely,
- * when a Merkle tree page is read, we also try to piggy-back on
- * some additional pages -- up to 1/4 the number of data pages.
- *
- * This improves sequential read performance, as it greatly
- * reduces the number of I/O requests made to the Merkle tree.
- */
- max_ra_pages = bio->bi_iter.bi_size >> (PAGE_SHIFT + 2);
- }
- bio_for_each_folio_all(fi, bio) {
- if (!verify_data_blocks(fi.folio, fi.length, fi.offset,
- max_ra_pages)) {
- bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_bio);
- #endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */
- /**
- * fsverity_enqueue_verify_work() - enqueue work on the fs-verity workqueue
- * @work: the work to enqueue
- *
- * Enqueue verification work for asynchronous processing.
- */
- void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work)
- {
- queue_work(fsverity_read_workqueue, work);
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_enqueue_verify_work);
- void __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void)
- {
- /*
- * Use a high-priority workqueue to prioritize verification work, which
- * blocks reads from completing, over regular application tasks.
- *
- * For performance reasons, don't use an unbound workqueue. Using an
- * unbound workqueue for crypto operations causes excessive scheduler
- * latency on ARM64.
- */
- fsverity_read_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("fsverity_read_queue",
- WQ_HIGHPRI,
- num_online_cpus());
- if (!fsverity_read_workqueue)
- panic("failed to allocate fsverity_read_queue");
- }
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