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- The dm-integrity target emulates a block device that has additional
- per-sector tags that can be used for storing integrity information.
- A general problem with storing integrity tags with every sector is that
- writing the sector and the integrity tag must be atomic - i.e. in case of
- crash, either both sector and integrity tag or none of them is written.
- To guarantee write atomicity, the dm-integrity target uses journal, it
- writes sector data and integrity tags into a journal, commits the journal
- and then copies the data and integrity tags to their respective location.
- The dm-integrity target can be used with the dm-crypt target - in this
- situation the dm-crypt target creates the integrity data and passes them
- to the dm-integrity target via bio_integrity_payload attached to the bio.
- In this mode, the dm-crypt and dm-integrity targets provide authenticated
- disk encryption - if the attacker modifies the encrypted device, an I/O
- error is returned instead of random data.
- The dm-integrity target can also be used as a standalone target, in this
- mode it calculates and verifies the integrity tag internally. In this
- mode, the dm-integrity target can be used to detect silent data
- corruption on the disk or in the I/O path.
- When loading the target for the first time, the kernel driver will format
- the device. But it will only format the device if the superblock contains
- zeroes. If the superblock is neither valid nor zeroed, the dm-integrity
- target can't be loaded.
- To use the target for the first time:
- 1. overwrite the superblock with zeroes
- 2. load the dm-integrity target with one-sector size, the kernel driver
- will format the device
- 3. unload the dm-integrity target
- 4. read the "provided_data_sectors" value from the superblock
- 5. load the dm-integrity target with the the target size
- "provided_data_sectors"
- 6. if you want to use dm-integrity with dm-crypt, load the dm-crypt target
- with the size "provided_data_sectors"
- Target arguments:
- 1. the underlying block device
- 2. the number of reserved sector at the beginning of the device - the
- dm-integrity won't read of write these sectors
- 3. the size of the integrity tag (if "-" is used, the size is taken from
- the internal-hash algorithm)
- 4. mode:
- D - direct writes (without journal) - in this mode, journaling is
- not used and data sectors and integrity tags are written
- separately. In case of crash, it is possible that the data
- and integrity tag doesn't match.
- J - journaled writes - data and integrity tags are written to the
- journal and atomicity is guaranteed. In case of crash,
- either both data and tag or none of them are written. The
- journaled mode degrades write throughput twice because the
- data have to be written twice.
- R - recovery mode - in this mode, journal is not replayed,
- checksums are not checked and writes to the device are not
- allowed. This mode is useful for data recovery if the
- device cannot be activated in any of the other standard
- modes.
- 5. the number of additional arguments
- Additional arguments:
- journal_sectors:number
- The size of journal, this argument is used only if formatting the
- device. If the device is already formatted, the value from the
- superblock is used.
- interleave_sectors:number
- The number of interleaved sectors. This values is rounded down to
- a power of two. If the device is already formatted, the value from
- the superblock is used.
- buffer_sectors:number
- The number of sectors in one buffer. The value is rounded down to
- a power of two.
- The tag area is accessed using buffers, the buffer size is
- configurable. The large buffer size means that the I/O size will
- be larger, but there could be less I/Os issued.
- journal_watermark:number
- The journal watermark in percents. When the size of the journal
- exceeds this watermark, the thread that flushes the journal will
- be started.
- commit_time:number
- Commit time in milliseconds. When this time passes, the journal is
- written. The journal is also written immediatelly if the FLUSH
- request is received.
- internal_hash:algorithm(:key) (the key is optional)
- Use internal hash or crc.
- When this argument is used, the dm-integrity target won't accept
- integrity tags from the upper target, but it will automatically
- generate and verify the integrity tags.
- You can use a crc algorithm (such as crc32), then integrity target
- will protect the data against accidental corruption.
- You can also use a hmac algorithm (for example
- "hmac(sha256):0123456789abcdef"), in this mode it will provide
- cryptographic authentication of the data without encryption.
- When this argument is not used, the integrity tags are accepted
- from an upper layer target, such as dm-crypt. The upper layer
- target should check the validity of the integrity tags.
- recalculate
- Recalculate the integrity tags automatically. It is only valid
- when using internal hash.
- journal_crypt:algorithm(:key) (the key is optional)
- Encrypt the journal using given algorithm to make sure that the
- attacker can't read the journal. You can use a block cipher here
- (such as "cbc(aes)") or a stream cipher (for example "chacha20",
- "salsa20", "ctr(aes)" or "ecb(arc4)").
- The journal contains history of last writes to the block device,
- an attacker reading the journal could see the last sector nubmers
- that were written. From the sector numbers, the attacker can infer
- the size of files that were written. To protect against this
- situation, you can encrypt the journal.
- journal_mac:algorithm(:key) (the key is optional)
- Protect sector numbers in the journal from accidental or malicious
- modification. To protect against accidental modification, use a
- crc algorithm, to protect against malicious modification, use a
- hmac algorithm with a key.
- This option is not needed when using internal-hash because in this
- mode, the integrity of journal entries is checked when replaying
- the journal. Thus, modified sector number would be detected at
- this stage.
- block_size:number
- The size of a data block in bytes. The larger the block size the
- less overhead there is for per-block integrity metadata.
- Supported values are 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096 bytes. If not
- specified the default block size is 512 bytes.
- legacy_recalculate
- Allow recalculating of volumes with HMAC keys. This is disabled by
- default for security reasons - an attacker could modify the volume,
- set recalc_sector to zero, and the kernel would not detect the
- modification.
- The journal mode (D/J), buffer_sectors, journal_watermark, commit_time can
- be changed when reloading the target (load an inactive table and swap the
- tables with suspend and resume). The other arguments should not be changed
- when reloading the target because the layout of disk data depend on them
- and the reloaded target would be non-functional.
- The layout of the formatted block device:
- * reserved sectors (they are not used by this target, they can be used for
- storing LUKS metadata or for other purpose), the size of the reserved
- area is specified in the target arguments
- * superblock (4kiB)
- * magic string - identifies that the device was formatted
- * version
- * log2(interleave sectors)
- * integrity tag size
- * the number of journal sections
- * provided data sectors - the number of sectors that this target
- provides (i.e. the size of the device minus the size of all
- metadata and padding). The user of this target should not send
- bios that access data beyond the "provided data sectors" limit.
- * flags - a flag is set if journal_mac is used
- * journal
- The journal is divided into sections, each section contains:
- * metadata area (4kiB), it contains journal entries
- every journal entry contains:
- * logical sector (specifies where the data and tag should
- be written)
- * last 8 bytes of data
- * integrity tag (the size is specified in the superblock)
- every metadata sector ends with
- * mac (8-bytes), all the macs in 8 metadata sectors form a
- 64-byte value. It is used to store hmac of sector
- numbers in the journal section, to protect against a
- possibility that the attacker tampers with sector
- numbers in the journal.
- * commit id
- * data area (the size is variable; it depends on how many journal
- entries fit into the metadata area)
- every sector in the data area contains:
- * data (504 bytes of data, the last 8 bytes are stored in
- the journal entry)
- * commit id
- To test if the whole journal section was written correctly, every
- 512-byte sector of the journal ends with 8-byte commit id. If the
- commit id matches on all sectors in a journal section, then it is
- assumed that the section was written correctly. If the commit id
- doesn't match, the section was written partially and it should not
- be replayed.
- * one or more runs of interleaved tags and data. Each run contains:
- * tag area - it contains integrity tags. There is one tag for each
- sector in the data area
- * data area - it contains data sectors. The number of data sectors
- in one run must be a power of two. log2 of this value is stored
- in the superblock.
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